Eliminative Materalism

Introduction to Eliminative Materialism

Eliminative materialism is a radical view within the philosophy of mind.
Contrary to the majority of philosophical theories, it outright denies the existence of some or all types of mental states.

Key Principles of Eliminative Materialism

Mental states that we believe and speak of, like desires, beliefs, or emotions, do not actually exist. They are simply folk psychology concepts.
The term ‘folk psychology’ refers to our everyday understanding and explanation of mind and behaviour based on mental experiences and states.
Eliminative materialists argue that folk psychology is a deeply flawed and outdated theory; a remnant from a prescientific age.
Mental states will not be found and explained by future neuroscience because these ‘states’ are not real phenomena, but rather linguistic conveniences.

Key Figures and Arguments

Paul and Patricia Churchland are key proponents of eliminative materialism.
The Churchlands argue that as neuroscience progresses, we will eventually eliminate the need for folk psychological explanations in favour of neuroscientific accounts.
They liken mental states to obsolete theories in science, such as the four humours in medicine or the phlogiston theory in chemistry.

Criticisms of Eliminative Materialism

Some argue that eliminative materialism makes a category mistake by considering folk psychology to be a theory. Instead, they suggest it might be a different kind of knowledge, such as know-how.
Many philosophers question the coherence of eliminative materialism, arguing that it is self-refuting. If beliefs do not exist, then the belief in eliminative materialism itself cannot exist.
The extreme nature of eliminative materialism makes it a contentious and controversial viewpoint within the philosophy of mind. Despite this, its challenge to mainstream cognitive theories makes it a significant part of the metaphysics of mind discussion.