Issues Epiphenomenalist Dualism

Issues Epiphenomenalist Dualism

Defining Epiphenomenalist Dualism

• Epiphenomenalism is a type of dualism that asserts that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but have no effects upon any physical events.
• It postulates that mental phenomena are the byproducts of physical processes but do not influence these processes, thus has a unidirectional causation – physical to mental, not the other way round.

Key Arguments of Epiphenomenalist Dualism

• The interaction problem: Epiphenomenalism solves the issue of how the non-physical mind and physical body interact by positing that it’s a one-way interaction.
• Biological evidence: Proponents of Epiphenomenalist Dualism point to our current understanding of the brain and nervous system, arguing that these physical processes fully account for human behaviour.

Critiques of Epiphenomenalist Dualism

• Free will problem: If mental events don’t cause physical events, it questions the concept of free will, which is a deep-seated intuition for many.
• Introspection: The belief is that we have introspective access to our minds and that our conscious thoughts often lead to intentional actions, which directly conflicts with Epiphenomenalism.

Theoretical Positions Contrasting Epiphenomenalist Dualism

• Interactionist Dualism: This contrasts Epiphenomenalist Dualism, postulating a two-way interaction between mental and physical events.
• Physicalism: This rejects the notion of mind-body dualism altogether, instead arguing that mental states are entirely physical in nature.

Key Philosophers Associated with Epiphenomenalist Dualism

• Thomas Huxley: An avid advocate of Epiphenomenalism, he drew analogies between the body and a steam-whistle that doesn’t contribute to the workings of an engine.
• Frank Jackson: Known for his Knowledge Argument which questions the completeness of physicalist descriptions of the mind; it complements Epiphenomenalist positions.