Mind Brain Type Identity Theory

Mind-Brain Type Identity Theory (MBTIT) is a reductive materialist theory that posits mental states are fundamentally identical to brain states.
Developed throughout the 20th Century, with key proponents including J.J.C. Smart and U.T. Place.
It is sometimes referred to as Central-state Materialism or Type Physicalism.

Emphasises the categoric equivalence of mental states and physical brain states.
Argues that for each type of mental state, there exists a corresponding and identifiable physical brain state.
Maintains that mental states are ‘nothing over and above’ their corresponding brain states, emphasizing a one-to-one relationship.

The Argument from Simplicity: Emphasises the elegance and fewer ontological commitments of MBTIT compared to dualist theories.
The Causal Closure Argument: Asserts that every physical event has a sufficient physical cause, hence mental processes, influencing behaviours, must be physical.
Empirical evidence linking specific mental phenomena with specific areas of the brain, e.g., through neuroscience and cognitive psychology frameworks.

Multiple Realisability: Hilary Putnam’s critique that mental states can be realised in multiple physical systems, suggesting a many-to-one relationship, contrary to the type identity’s one-to-one claim.
Incompleteness and early stage of neuroscience: Critics note that the inability of current neuroscience to elucidate all mental phenomena limits the scope and validity of MBTIT.
The Qualia Argument: Qualitative subjective experiences cannot be captured purely through physical description of brain states. This is illustrated by thought experiments such as Frank Jackson’s ‘Mary’s Room’.

Unresolved issues, like those presented by the ‘qualia argument’ and ‘multiple realizability’, continue to challenge MBTIT.
Nonetheless, it provides a parsimonious and empirically grounded framework to understand the nature of mental phenomena.
Its scientific aligning and the increasing evidence base from neuroscience make it an ongoing influential theory in the field of philosophy of mind.