An assessment of the Munich agreement

I. Background of the Munich Agreement

The Munich Agreement was signed on 30 September 1938.
It was an agreement between Germany, Britain, France and Italy, effectively permitting Nazi Germany’s annexation of the Sudetenland, a region of Czechoslovakia inhabited by more than 3 million German-speaking people.
British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain believed that the agreement would bring “peace for our time”. This sentiment reflected a policy of appeasement, a diplomatic policy of making concessions to an adversary to avoid conflict.

II. Operational Details of the Agreement

Hitler was allowed to annex the Sudetenland, provided he promised not to invade anywhere else.
Czechoslovakia was told about the agreement and was given no option but to comply.
The Eden Group, within the British government, was opposed, considering the agreement a sign of Britain’s weakness.

III. Impact and Consequence of the Agreement

The Munich Agreement did not bring about “peace for our time”; instead, it encouraged Hitler’s notion of expanding Germany’s borders.
The deal left Czechoslovakia defenceless and soon led to its complete occupation by Germany in March 1939.
This betrayal, known as the Munich Betrayal, stimulated a significant re-orientation of the French Third Republic’s alliances and, together with the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, sharply accelerated World War II.

IV. Assessment of the Munich Agreement

The Munich Agreement is often seen as a failed act of appeasement, human cost aside, it did buy time for the Allies to prepare for war.
It indicated the Allies’ initial strategy towards Germany - a combination of hope that Hitler was bluffing and fear that German military might was too strong to resist.
The Munich Agreement can be viewed as a continuation of the Western betrayal sentiment because of simultaneous secret discussions to reach a separate peace with Germany.
The Czechs and Slovaks refer to the Munich Agreement as the “Munich Betrayal” as Czechoslovakia was not invited to the conference.
Over time the judgement of the Agreement has become more nuanced with some acknowledging the harsh realities of the situation in 1938 with others continuing to view it as a policy of cowardice.