An assessment of the success of British foreign policy in containing Fascist aggression, 1935 to March 1938

Assessment of British Foreign Policy in Containment of Fascist Aggression

Policy of Appeasement

Appeasement Policy: Initiated by Britain under the leadership of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, with the belief that the dictatorships were driven by genuine grievances and that these could be resolved through diplomatic negotiation.
Rationale Behind the Policy: at this time, Britain faced huge economic and military constraints and was unprepared for war. Thus, appeasement was perceived as the best approach to avoid another large-scale conflict.
Significant Events: The Munich Agreement of 1938, allowed Germany to annex Sudetenland, in Czechoslovakia - an act seen as Anglo-French appeasement.

Strengths and Shortcomings of Appeasement

Partial Success: initially, appeasement seemed successful as it temporarily maintained European peace and allowed time for Britain to rearm.
Increased Fascist Aggression: however, the appeasement policy ultimately failed to prevent WWII, as it emboldened Hitler, making him more aggressive, and it failed to halt Italian aggression in Abyssinia.
Understimation of Nazi Ambitions: British foreign policy hugely underestimated the territorial ambitions of Hitler, in turn compromising the security of Europe.

British Reactions to Fascist Aggression

Non-Intervention in the Spanish Civil War: Britain maintained a policy of non-intervention during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), not opposing the fascist powers directly, despite their blatant defiance of this policy.
League of Nations and Collective Security: Britain, as part of the League of Nations, tried to maintain collective security, but this was undermined by the organisation’s weaknesses.

British Foreign Policy towards Italy

British Stance against Italy: following Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia in 1935, Britain, while condemning the action, failed to enforce effective sanctions to halt the aggression.
Hoare-Laval Pact: this secret agreement, proposed by British and French foreign ministers, would have effectively rewarded Italy for her aggression against Abyssinia – it caused a huge scandal when it was leaked.

British Foreign Policy towards Germany

Anglo-German Naval Agreement: in 1935, Britain signed an agreement allowing Germany to build a navy up to 35% of the size of the British navy, seen as a blatant underestimation of the threat posed by Nazi Germany.
Policy towards Anschluss: Britain chose not to intervene when Germany enforced the Anschluss (the annexation of Austria) in March 1938, illustrating a continued approach of appeasement.

In conclusion, Britain’s foreign policy from 1935 to March 1938 had limited success in containing fascist aggression. Britain largely followed a policy of appeasement, seeking to avert war and maintain peace. Nonetheless, this policy ultimately proved inadequate in the face of increasing fascist expansionism, leading to the outbreak of WWII.